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Are the US still an ally? Did it even become an opponent? The fact that Europeans ask these questions show how radically Donald Trump and its new administration rewrote the conditions of the transatlantic safety relationship. Trump refused to exclude the use of force to take control of Greenland, the sovereign territory of NATO Ally Denmark. In his hurry to reach an agreement with Russia to end his war against Ukraine, Trump's team did early concessions To Moscow during the cut -out Kyiv and European capitals from interviews. American officials say they want a fair and sustainable peace in Ukraine, but at the same time take care of the country Mineral as a back payment for previous US military assistance.
It has always been clear that the US would force Europeans to take more burden on their own security. The question was whether the shift would be agreed and proper or whether it would be chaotic and dangerous. Europe missed the moment when it was preparing for the former and now facing others.
After a Russian invasion of Ukraine three years ago, Europeans could not be overwhelmed at speed and measure that Russian unprovoked aggression demanded, regardless of the efforts of Poland and other frontline countries and some defense innovations in the EU. Trump's return to power and the antagonism of his administration broke the satisfaction of Europe.
Emergency meeting of European leaders in Paris On Monday, the initial chance was to show renewed determination and ambition to rebuild the defense of the continent and ensure that any peaceful agreement of Ukraine is fair and resistant. But that was unconditionally inconclusive. British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer Boldly said he was ready to send troops to Ukraine to guarantee peace after housing if the US provided a deposit. Other leaders considered the question too difficult. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz Churlishly said he was “irritated”, the problem appeared at all.
Europe should still act in its long -term interests, although it would try to defend itself today without American support. Its future security will be decided in Ukraine, so its first duty is to increase the military assistance of Kiev by financing Ukrainian weapons production, pouring resources into drone and anti-drone technology, subsidies of extended production capacity and signing long-term contracts to replace the US- There are air defense and long reach strikes. He could use his sanction regime to access and influence negotiations.
European powers must draw up military plans to re -discourage Russia from the attack on Ukraine, from better training of Ukrainian troops to promote the no -fly zone to potential sending soldiers as “assured strength”. Instead of shoes on the ground in sufficient quantities would be a huge effort. Without support, it can be impossible. But Europeans cannot discourage Russia by standing aside.
Finally, Europeans have to invest. Especially the strengthening of defense requires a permanent increase in national defense expenditures, while the country revises their fiscal frameworks and expenditure priorities to create space. There is a strong reason for common loans, whether at the EU or as a willing coalition, including the United Kingdom, to finance a short -term increase in expenditure and financing joint public procurement. The multilateral defense bank could also help government and defense manufacturers. Europe will also have to build separate planning and structure of command, ideally within NATO, but potentially outside.
It is not impossible for these steps to persuade Trump to hold the crushed alliance and maintain the final warranty of US security for Europe. It is certain that without such a generation Europe will be dangerously exposed.
